The State and Politicization of Governance in Post 1990 Africa: A Political Economy

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Abstract: Novel expectations for democratization re-emerged at the Post- Cold War Africa following the return to multi -party elections and the dismantling of one party authoritarian regime. What remains largely unclear and poorly studied is the dynamics of the State and Governance at Post -Cold War Africa .This paper deployed the Marxian political economy framework and examined the State and governance nexus in Africa’s nascent democracy in the period 1990 to 2014. It argued that the State in Africa remains increasingly elitist and predatory despite the end to one party autocratic regime and multi -party elections. The substantial strategy has been “the politicization of governance”. It conceptualized this theoretical model to demonstrate how the State and governance deploy coercive instrumentalities to appropriate political power . The salient dimensions are explored to demonstrate that the State has remained a “derisive apparatus” in naked pursuit of power. In particular, it demonstrates how political patronage is fought for, resisted or propagated and how this has increasingly resulted in failure of governance and development.

Keywords: The State , Politics, Governance, Democracy, Development, Africa

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the emergence of modern State, relationships and interactions among actors within the State orbit have ever been more important to explore the study of governance as a mode of theoretical and empirical inquiry and as activity of people in government. Very often, discussions on the State have been fluid and theoretically unclear. Much of this fuzziness is discernible in post independent African States characterized with internal crisis and wars giving rise to the notion of failed States(Mazrui,1999). In particular, the State is regarded with deep suspicion as an agent of capitalism (Ekekwe,1986).

In five decades of political independence, African scholars have increasingly debated the issues of the State and governance in Africa with minimal cutting edge results. Although the historicity of Africa is central to its backwardness and poverty such as slavery, slave trade, conquests, colonial plunder, neo colonialism, imperialism etc which have been substantial part of debates on Africa’s under development(Rodney,1972). Such historical depictions may not easily fritter away in any accurate analysis of the post -colonial State, governance and development in Africa.

One of the central challenges of the post- colonial African State has been governance. As a number of African States became democratic in the 1990s, the State and governance- two critical terms in the 21st century development discourse become prone to scholarly interrogation. The nexus between the State and governance are divergent encompassing a wide range of institutions and actors.

Government is an element of the State while governance is the process or art of governing. The State apparatus is multi -functional depending on the use to which it is deployed. The State variously could be purveyor of territorial integrity, guarantor of safety of lives and property of citizens. On the contrary, the State could be a destructive apparatus, oppressive, repressive and dictatorial.

In generic context, the dialectic of building and destroying largely relies with the State which is seemingly embedded in patterns of governance. In developed societies, the State is considered an impartial arbiter, a neutral umpire in governance. But in bestial political systems the State is partisan, vilified, hijacked and can engage in all sorts of activities(Nwankwo,1985). The State in Africa will be explored within the later variant.

Ake(1996)demonstrates that the post-colonial African leaders failed to change the character of the colonial state both as a coercive instrument and its inability to “transform power into authority and domination in to hegemony”.

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Critical perspectives debunk blaming Africa’s underdevelopment solely on colonialism and Western imperialism rather contend that leadership failure is central as countries of South East Asia are developing while their African counterparts failed to follow suit (Achebe, 1983; Okowa, 1996; Amadi, 2012). For instance, the three decades of post-colonial Africa was characterized with one party system, life President, military coups and counter military coups, despotic and dictatorial governance. A number of post-colonial dictators such as Mobutu Seceeko of Zaire, Jean-BadelBokassa of Central African Republic, Francisco MacasNguema, of Equatorial Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, GnassingbeEyadama of Togo, Idi Amin of Uganda, ArapMoi of Kenya, Nimeryy of Sudan etc, were dominant leaders of post-colonial Africa.

Tanzanian scholar Abdul Babu (1981:6) recounts that at the attainment of independence African leaders acquired for themselves plush cars and luxurious apartments in contrast with shanties in which those they were ruling inhabited.

In the 1990s, democracy became the only game in town, (Linz and Stephan, 1996) with increasingly complex neoliberal trajectories at the post Washington Consensus which began to spread in global contexts – democratization, globalization, information communication technology (ICT) etc became key development issues of the decade. Castells (2000) contends that a new society—had emerged such technology driven societies are in sharp contrast with massive poverty in Africa, at variance with the rise of the network states in South East Asia.

In this study, the State in Africa is explored as an instrument of coercion to reinforce its retrogressive stance against the people and the common wealth. This conceptualization as argued is demonstrated within the social relations of resurgent political practice that encompasses rent seeking, predatory, corruption etc defined within the precincts of politicization of governance—. The article argues that the State in Africa remains elitist in character (Ake, 1985; Ekekeke, 1986), and undermines developmental democracy.

The article demonstrates how the State in neo liberal Africa is implicated like the colonial state whose very essence was its dictatorial, all powerful, repressive, alien, and authoritarian nature embodying coercion and cooption within European superstructure and hegemony increasingly imposed on African societies, largely treated as mere subjects of imperial occupation (Young, 2000). It places the State at the center of governance and contends that the contemporary State in Africa is the executive committee of an exploitative junta dissociated from the critical mass. It argues that politicization of governance is a derivative apparatus: it is on this later premise that the central problem of this article will be explored which is contemporary dimensions of politicization of governance.

The observation generated by this thesis is that the politicization of governance has produced massively infinitesimal development results in Africa. The article will lay out a theoretical framework for this debate to demonstrate how the State apparatus has substantially remained an instrument of extortion and exploitation.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The current concern with the role of the State in present order is increasingly a result of the emergence of political economy as the dominant paradigm in the study of development. Marxists, neo-Marxists and pluralists now focus on the State as a central actor in the process of political and economic change (Keller, 1991). The persuasion to deploy a political economy framework as an extant theoretical approach to explore the State and governance in Africa stems from the fact that a wave of prevailing traditional approaches have been uncritical and particularly grown out of place to critically explain salient ongoing development issues in contemporary Africa such as globalization, terrorism, poverty, inequality, insecurity, corruption, human rights violation, conflicts etc that are taking place within Africa since democracy resurgence in the 1990s.

Both the State and governance intersect in many ways and should be mutually reinforcing and inextricably linked. Essentially, as the degree of State failure increases, the interrogation of both concepts becomes inevitable. For scholars of development bent, this re-evaluation is expedient, with a Marxist political economy framework. Marx had argued that the State is an embodiment of inevitable contradictions of class distinction (Ake, 1981). In particular, the Marxist political economy framework provides further insights within the broader political and economic dialectics which
highlight salient trends in Africa that build on a generalization that Africa has not evolved suitable governance to chart development cause within the political space provided by Western democracy (Mukandala, 2002).

For a methodological tool deployed in this study, a relational content analysis (RCA) was adopted as a suitable methodology to examine both quantitative and qualitative data. Content analysis can be a useful technique for allowing a researcher to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention (Weber, 1990). Both primary and secondary data were deployed for the study. The primary data included a sample of twenty (20) African countries collected through a multi-state sampling technique with a total of 200 primary data collected through online administered questionnaires covering the period 1990 to 2014. The data were encoded and converted into percentages. The secondary data derived from exiting relevant literature, books, journal publications and internet materials. The researchers searched key academic journals in the Proquest and Ebsco databases, using key words such as the State, politicization of governance, governance in Africa etc. About 150 related items were found. What follows are the conceptual issues.

2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Although both the State and governance in Africa are surrounded with a number of conceptual and theoretical issues, this article does not intend to draw a genealogical mapping of these theoretical debates rather it will examine most relevant perspectives. It conceptualizes the State then governance before a theoretical exploration of politicization of governance— and beyond that, demonstrates how this dynamic has been an integral component of Africa’s development failure and resurgent democracy recession since the late 1990s. What follows include the conceptual issues.

The State

There are divergent conceptual issues raised on the concept of State. Such multidisciplinary conceptions bring to bear the ever increasing relevance of the State in contemporary governance and development debates. Ralph Miliband (1969) argued that the State is not a thing,…it does not as such exist. What the State stands for is a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system (Miliband, 1969). Within this system, Ekekwe (1986:10) contends that it is the government—that engages in active representation of the state. He shows that Miliband (1969) contends that this does not presuppose that the state is always effectively controlled by the government. Much of this debate finds better expression in ‘politicization of governance’ which substantially demonstrates salient elements of failure of the government to control the State. Miliband (1969:50) argues that the extent the governments do control the state is one of the major questions to be determined. He identified other key constituent elements in the state system which include the bureaucracy, the cohesive apparatus (police, army, prisons), the judiciary and the lower levels of government that exist in the formation (Miliband, 1969, 54; Ekekwe, 1986:10).

Ake (1985:1) described the State in Africa as a modality for class and elite domination mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society and appears as an objective force alongside society.

The liberal perspective conceives the state as a neutral umpire which reconciles contending issues within the elite (Darl, 1956; Held, 1972; Macpherson, 1974). Thus, this view presupposes the absence of a dominant power. On the contrary, the Marxists contend that the state is riddled with class contradictions. Ekekwe (1986:58) reinforced the class analysis of state debate in Africa and argued that the colonial state played a major role in the class based structure of the post-colonial African state. The State form of domination as Ake(1985) recounts is the modality in which the system of mechanisms of class domination is largely independent of social class, including the hegemonic social class.

Since the return to democracy in the 1990s, the search for significant changes in the State apparatus and governance has been palpable as the State remains largely criminalized. Ake(2001:6) identified the “totalistic scope” of the State and the posture the State takes as an “apparatus of violence”, including its increasing “narrow social base” and penchant for “coercion in place of authority”. Ekekwe (1986:4) had identified the role the State in Africa play in the capitalist accumulation process. This is replicated in most debates that conceive state in Africa to be elitist (Ake, 1981; Ekekwe, 1986).
With the decline in autocratic one party states and return to multiparty democracy in Africa, the State reappeared on the scene and was brandished as a symbol of development, social justice, equality, economic recovery, transparency and incorruptibility with nascent democracy. On the contrary, a number of debates point to some set-backs. Hyden, (2006) conceptualizes the personal-rule paradigm, in African politics – to explore patterns of governance in Africa. Jean-Francois Bayart,(1999) offers theoretical insights on the functioning of African states and refutes exiting theories and debates in the literature that largely examine Africa from racial, ethnic, colonial or evolutionary terms, rather proffers some critical indicators and novel analytic frameworks to comprehend Africa detailing the roles played by history, hegemony, governmentality and extroversion. Ekeh,(1989:5) re-echoed the problems associated with the political history of Africa as a “tale of drift and instability” in which the “State stands above, set aside and apart from the society”. Ekeh(1989:5) demonstrates that “invariably African state is arbitrary as it operates outside the sphere of societal rules. This arbitrariness paints African culture on a negative light with elements such as corruption, violence and mistrust”.

At the conceptual level are debates which explore the State from security perspective to demonstrate state failure in Africa(Ayoob,1995;Mazrui,1995;Klare,1996). Writing on the Horn of Africa, Bayart et al;(1999) corroborate Mohamed Salih who argued that the State can be the source of citizen insecurity, stressing that the end of the Cold War in the Horn of Africa did not lead to prosperity rather the end of super power rivalry, led to state actions that resulted in more human insecurity, human rights abuse, and absence of democracy and general political discontent.

Though state scholarship has offered a compelling critique of current conceptions of the State in Africa(1986;Klare,1996;Mazrui,1995;Ake,1978,1996;Ayoob;1995; Ndegea, 2001), solutions proffered to achieve a developmental state – are insufficient. Mukandala, (2002) notes that the State of popular democracy in Africa is inevitably as checkered if not more so than that of Liberal Democracy. Critical perspectives dismiss the normative assumptions of the State in Africa, for instance, Mkandawire (2001)argues that the “ought” – has proved more interesting than the “is”–, that this makes State debate in Africa most pontifical and teleological than any other theme.

On the need for restructuring the African state, Animode (2000) points out that any effective change in the post-colonial African state to start with should encompass mass mobilization, popular participation and empowerment of the people at all levels of society, particularly the poor and rural population. He argues for a systematic and all-inclusive political education, promotion of popular choices of policies and programmes.

This article explores the State as an autonomous political unit, within a definite territory and given population which has legitimate centralized power to govern its territory. It is conceived here as a sovereign entity that exercises supreme rule over its territory. The elements of a state include; people, territory, sovereignty and government. Conceptual debates on the State suggest that African state has not been transformed as core challenges such as economic diversification, poverty, representative government has remained ineffectual despite the resurgent representative democracy.

Equally, African democracy has been minimally transformative due largely to non-democracy culture, an institutional framework that tailors democracy deepening and sustainability. Thus, democracy in Africa has only legitimized multiparty elections, the core democratic institutions such as human rights, transparency, accountability and more importantly effective regime alternation have been minimal. The article turns to conceptual exploration of the term governance.

**Governance**

Conceptually, governance is conceived as the art of governing. Foucault (1991) used the term “governmentality”, to explore contending views and approaches of a government with respect to its organizational structure, the society and the interplay of power within that society. Foucault(1991) justifies deploying the term governmentality to avoid what he termed “unwarranted totalization” embedded in use of concepts such as culture, problems of legitimacy and hegemony.

Posner and Young (2007) identified critical yardsticks to explore governance and patterns of democracy in Africa beyond such taxonomy as full, facade, hybrid or, at-risk democracies. They contend that it is more worthwhile to examine whether the behavior of the political actor is in line
with the rules of governance or not, therefore possibly subject to restraint. Bratton (2007), provides a comparative analysis of formal versus informal institutions in governance in Africa,– the contention has been how such informal structures as patronimonial autocracy, ethnic ties and patronage have reappeared in Africa’s governance.

On governance and globalization debate, Ocampo (2010) expresses disappointment in governance and contends that central to this in the ongoing globalization is “the deficit in governance” and the decline of nation-states which have not been substituted by new forms of governance either of a regional or global character.

Proponents of developmental administration in Africa (Mkandawire 1996; Amadi and Ekekwe,2014) focus on institutional overhaul and democracy culture for economic transformation. The long-standing assumption of developmental administration is the possible strategic overhaul of both institutional and ideological mindset of Africa which is marred by public corruption (Amadi and Ekekwe, 2014). The argument is for an effective micro economic policy as a buffer to economic drivers and development. This has been consistent with most contemporary development scholarship– than the traditional definition espoused by realism within the formal frame of rulership. (Okowa,1995;Ocampo,2010). Thus, governance is key to development.

In view of the idea of multiparty elections, evolving free, fair and credible elections have been at issue. Poor electoral system largely remains at issue in choice of leaders and the quality of governance they deliver. Several democracy decades have not measured up to expectations. A different response is to qualify the ongoing failures but also to identify the major successes of the neo liberal construct such as multi- party elections, novel civil society awareness etc. In particular to understand that the developmental constructions of democratic governance are innate to the respective sectors of the polity, rather thanemasculate them.

However, even though the redefinition of governance has been more in line with the conventional debates put forward by revolutionist theorists, that the State is elitist (Ake,1996), the capacity for governance for instance critically evaluates the ability of a leader to be capable to govern .This goes beyond the patrimonial ,ethnic or similar patronage that characterizes the choice and emergence of political leaders in Africa. An instigation of the capacity for governance is crucial to any analysis in developmental administration as it is governance that largely strengthens human capacity and the economy. How Africa’s nascent democracy has keyed into the development paradigm remains largely unknown. While the ongoing nascent democracy strives– to assume responsibility for development, its practicalities and tendency to achieve results in an approach that failed to be prudent, accountable ,resourceful requires urgent policy re-examination.

A major trend in post 1990 democracy is the rise of illiberal democracy(Zachari,1997) and post 2000s democracy recession (Diamond,2015)at the aftermath of the global economic recession of 2008.Diamond(2015)suggests that the decades-long global trend in democratization had previously come to a halt .Which Diamond termed “democracy recession” and argued that democracy is in retreat. That the dominant pattern in all regions over the past two years has been backsliding on previously attained progress in democratization.

Although it could be argued that addressing some of the governance failures in a neo liberal order are critical to economic transformation of Africa and possibly serve as buffer to alternative modalities for economic development– a key challenge is the vested interest of the stakeholders in governance-the elite and the unequal international capitalist system(Wallestein,1976). Such entrenched state structures in Africa will continue to viti ate the tenets of good governance, transparency, equality and social justice. The subsequent section examines the theoretical exploration of the logic of politicization of governance.

**THE POLITICIZATION OF GOVERNANCE: A THEORETICAL MODEL**

The politicization of governance offers a substantial explanation of the political realities of the State in post-colonial Africa. Ake (1994:16) contends that several decades of independence that post-independent State in Africa, is still largely conceived as a threat to civil society. He argues that the emergence of these parallel sites has reduced the state to —“a power resource and a fearsome nuisance” (Ake 1994:16).

Operationalization of the concept of politicization is expedient as Ebelin, (1995:4) argues that politicization takes the form of increasing the political power of the state, as against all other forms of...
power in society, of increasing the power of the politicians and the bureaucrats as against the power of individuals, private institutions, and voluntary associations.

Such interface between the bureaucracy and the state elite is reinforced in recent debates on the concept of politicization of governance(Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman,1981).This reasserts the term functional politicization of the state elite in which circumstance there is practical evidence of usurpation of state apparatus-(Mayntz and Derlien, 1989),involving civil servants at the centre of decision making in the state in which the highest level of administration becomes politicized .This results in the accumulation of resources in the hands of a small group resulting to “politicization of public administration”(William,2010).In most African countries this has been a common feature of the civil service despite their claim to neutrality and non- partisan. This was reflective in Nigeria during the Gowon administration era as the super permsecs–(Super Permanent Secretaries)were the core decision makers in governance(see Richard,1992).

While this article recognizes the significant gains made in the brief history of nascent democracy in Africa since the 1990s, more critical debates seek to explore the quality of neo liberal governance in Africa. This literature nonetheless sees important limitations in governance. The state as a visceral instrument of protection of lives and property has lost this veritable ethos at a time of revaluing insecurity, crimes, killings and terrorism in Africa. The state rather becomes predatory. Infighting such as insurgency becomes substantial element in governance. Bayart, et al;(1999: 25) posit that” politics in Africa is becoming markedly interconnected with crime”. The fundamental cause of these vices is the problem we seek to explore here, and our fundamental concern is to interrogate the State and governance since the resurgence of democracy in the 1990s from autocratic one party states to multi -party system. The aim is to fully grasp a political dynamic: the inherent logic in which the instrumentalities of the elites remain in the domain of power, in this particular context through- the politicization of governance.

For a clearer understanding of this concept, essentially in the context of the utilization of state apparatus, it is important to understand, first, the idea of politicization of governance.– As a frame work, politicization of governance avoids otherwise legitimate questions like, how elections could be conducted -free, fair and credible, how transparency and accountability could be institutionalized in governance, why poverty remains pervasive despite abundant material and human resources, how inequality( including gender)has been on the increase, how insecurity threatens the polity etc.

On the contrary, politicization of governance merely legitimizes democracy institutions but do not institutionalize democracy culture. It is the logic which prioritizes “business as usual” in governance, it fails to be accountable to the people nor protect their rights and integrity. It does not make for interrogation of the status quo rather it is oppressive, coercive as the citizens and their views are subsumed under the status quo. It vitiates the moral ethos of responsive and accountable leadership, consigns constitutionalism, in its place adopts conventional or adhoc strategies to defray constitutional provisions. It erodes achievement criteria in authoritative allocation of values rather ascribes positions and deploys patterns of coercion which under- rights the unit standards of governance namely development.

Posner and Young(2007)reinforce the theoretical model this article seeks to establish in the context of manipulation of instrumentalities of governance by the political elite when they argued that many African leaders still possess the power to shape outcomes to suit their preferences, even when those preferences conflict with formal limitations on what they are legally permitted to do. Presidents Daby, Bongo, Nujoma, and Eyadama were able to change their countries’ constitutions because their respective parties controlled more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament (Posner and Young,2007).

President Museveni lacked the supermajority required to change the constitution, but was able to use his control of state resources to buy the parliamentary votes he needed to pass the third-term amendment just as Nigeria’s Obasanjo tried to do, unsuccessfully. .., these examples would appear to vindicate the view of Africa as a place where leaders monopolize political and economic power so completely that their preferences do in fact take precedence over the formal rules of the game (Posner and Young 2007:134). Others in the legion of regime elongation are President Bouteflika of Algeria, President Blaise Compare of Burkina Faso etc.
Second, the concept of politicization of governance stresses that governance can be perceived largely as an agential apparatus; a channel of interface between the state and agents involving the elite (Nwankwo, 1985). Such prevarications create conduits and external complex linkages for appropriation of state resources resulting in economic alienation, exploitation and a repertoire of resource conflict largely an attribute of agential interface involving the local actors on one hand and their Western collaborators on the other.

Since the 1990s, till approximately late 2000s one implication of the ongoing political evolution has been public corruption, poverty, conflicts as in “the genocide in Burundi in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, the assassination of Kabila in 2001 in DRC, the 2003 coup and overthrow of President Ange-Felix Patasse of Central African Republic, the failed coup against Sao Tome President Fradique de Menezes on 16 July, 2003, the disintegration of South Sudan and Sudan in 2011 and ongoing crisis in South Sudan since December, 2013, the 2012 Mali coup, the 2014 protests against proposed constitutional changes to allow President Compare of Burkina Faso another five years in power which turned into a mass uprising that drove him from office, the ongoing crisis in the Great Horn, the rise of state terrorism such as Boko Haram in the northeast Nigeria, Tuareg in Algeria al-Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), the resurgence of secessionist agitation by the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) a group in southeast Nigeria clamoring for self-determination forty five years after Nigeria/Biafra civil war, the Shiites ethno-sectarian crisis in northwest Nigeria, the persistent killings by the Fulani cattle rustlers in northern Nigeria, parts of northcentral and eastern Nigeria etc.

Ultimately, politicization of governance tends to function as an instrument of negotiating access to state power and retaining same. As could be seen, the concept of politicization of governance runs the risk of being reiterative since evidence that the state is politicized is often drawn directly from the performance of the economy. This provides the notion of politicization of governance as anti-developmental if the economy is not developing. On the contrary, politicization may not entirely result in poverty and failures of the economy. For instance Aïdt (2010) had demonstrated that corruption may not always have negative impact on the economy. Since in this particular case it makes money available to run the economy but may equally result in the risk of inflation. Most African countries have not been able to attain such corruption induced positive developments to the best of our research findings.

The basic concern here is to show how politicization of governance enters, permeates into the state and becomes an integral part of governance pattern. In this specific context, some thoughts should be given to how such proclivities become legitimized by top government officials through political patronage such as the award of contracts through non due processes, the appointment of close allies and family members into top political offices, the deployment of non-achievement criteria for promotion of public office holders etc. These gradually assume some sort of conventional and moral stature with state officials.

When critically explored, it becomes evident that this is the political and economic trajectory that African leadership assumed since the return to democracy. Posner and Young (2007) point to the fact that a slew of powerful incumbent African presidents, including Malawi’s Muluzi, Ghana’s Rawlings, Kenya’s ArapMoi, Nigeria’s Obasanjo, and ultimately 10 others, were forced by term-limits to leave office since 2000 alone. In Benin Republic after the sovereign national conference of the 1990s both Mathieu Kérékou and Nicéphore Soglo alternated as President following wins and losses in national elections.

The persistent traces of failed governance, corruption, chronic poverty and insecurity in Africa are increasingly reflected in most recent scholarship (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Posner and Yong, 2007; Young, 2000; Amadi, 2012). Similarly, the logic of politicization of governance is deployed to undermine human rights and freedom such violation as in the case of the 2015 xenophobic attacks in South Africa, human trafficking, insurgency, insecurity, extra judicial killings etc.

Perhaps the most recent positive direction taken by Africa’s democracy is found in Nigeria’s 2015 general elections in which the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan accepted defeat at the polls, congratulated his opponent Muhammadu Buhari and handed over power successfully. However, corruption trailed the leadership of Jonathan as evidence of looting of national treasury abound including the arms procurement scandal involving his Chief Security adviser Sambo Dasuki. Equally in post genocide Rwanda, positive figuration of governance is promoted in development discourses.
Despite the alleged ordered nature of the State, in Africa there has been challenging failures such as corruption, insecurity, violence, wars, war crimes, including war time crimes such as sexual violence against women in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo etc (Tickner, 1992). There has been a marked absence of realist rejoinder on this debate as the article turns to the dimensions of politicization of governance.

2.1. Politicization of Democracy

Democracy has become a universal construct, seemingly an ideal and most popular form of government. The argument is that democracy is government of the people and in particular majority rule, due to the challenges of defining what constitutes the people, democracy settles for majority. Politicization of democracy has been “the politicization of the majority”. Arriving at majority has been at issue in most developing democracies. Thus, majority rule became the central ingredient to gain access to power.

The inherent contradictions of democracy lie in its politicization by Western pundits who could not institutionalize democracy culture in Africa. To foster democracy in Africa at the end of the Cold War, the West “arranged” there release of long incarcerated freedom fighter Nelson Mandela and conducted an election in 1994 allowing the defeat of apartheid leader Frederick de Clark (Mukandala, 2002). Democracy at some point readily becomes an imposed Western styled mode of governance at the triumph of capitalism. Scholars of all hue provide some explication of the patterns of democracy practice in Africa such as virtual democracy, nascent democracy, full democracy, facade democracy, hybrid democracy, at-risk democracy, consociation democracy, illiberal democracy—etc (Joseph, 1992; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Linz and Stepn, 1996; Zacharia, 1997). According to Ake (1996) the Western democracy and what main results it carries to Africa is yet unknown. Bratton and Van de Walle, (1994:458) argue that the “distinctive institutional hallmark of African regimes is neopatrimonialism”, in which the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law that the right to rule is ascribed to a person.

Why is it that those who do not care for Africa and Africans, and black people in particular all of a sudden became interested in Africa? Why is it that the American Intellectual reactionary right that provided the intellectual content of Reagan’s movement at Stanford, are the same people who led by Larry Diamond have carried the banner of the current democratization wave through the Journal of Democracy, books, conferences and workshops etc. Are they disinterested missionaries? Why is it that the very same people, who have led to the death of millions of Africans through denial of education and especially health and drugs through their structural adjustment policies informed as it is by the Washington consensus, are self-declared advocates of good governance – conditionalities, including electoral democracy? (p.7).

This is consistent with debates which argue that in a substantial number of instances Western democratization project was purely formal, and devoid of genuine practice (Young, 2000).

2.2. Politicization of Good Governance

“Good governance “has become a popular mantra in both political and developmental discourse. It – has gained currency in mainstream media and popular discourses and became idealized, idolated, rebranded and metaphorical in recent neo liberal debates. The good governance project as discussed
re-emerged in recent discourse from the World Bank to pursue its Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).

Conversely, SAPs were largely implemented with dictatorial administrations in Africa such as Nigeria under General Ibrahim Babangida, which deflected its claims to good governance. Adejumobi (2002) reveals the contradictions of the World Bank’s advocacy on good governance, rule of law and human rights in Africa, citing the un-democratic strategies deployed by the West through which the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) was imposed on African countries—which largely undermined both the development of Africa and the ideals of liberal democracy.

Adejumobi (2002) contends that SAPs, rather than empower the civil society, encourages its ruthless repression and dismemberment. Rudebeck and Tornquist (1996:8) argue that, “good governance—along with the instant crafting of democracy is often traded the same way I.M.F. and World Bank economists sell neo-liberal market solutions around the globe”.

Similarly, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which adopted as a programme of the African Union in March 2003, demonstrates African agency in tackling political, economic, corporate and social economic governance deficiencies through exploring—best practices in certain select countries. The most important instrument of the African Peer Review is the questionnaire. The APR questionnaire is divided into four sections: Democracy and Good Political Governance, Economic Governance and Management, Corporate Governance and Socio-Economic Governance. Each section of the draft questionnaire includes a list of relevant standards, major objectives, questions under each objective and indicators, which help flesh out the intent of the questions. The governance report which provides detailed analysis of quality of governance using certain indicators shows poor response to capacity for governance in Africa (Governance Report, 2014).

2.3. Politicization of AID

Western aid has generated intense debate from divergent perspectives. The West has increasingly remained the purveyor of “development” propagated in mainstream media. For instance in 2005 Africa was the focus of a G-8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, where the industrialized nations pledged to double development aid by 2010 and grant debt release to the poorest countries. Non-including Britain is on track with its aid. Rather there has been an increase in decline on aid to the poor countries (See OECD, 2007).

The—politicization of aid—include capitalist control mechanisms embedded in exploitation tied to the apron strings of the donor countries (Animode, 1988). The debate on aid is broad and ranges from a number of perspectives both commemorative and pejorative. For instance Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo, advocates phasing out development aid to Africa. Sachs (2005) argues on increasing the volume of aid to Africa.

In 2000 world leaders gathered in one of the largest UN summits and adopted the millennium project with targets and goals aimed at reducing poverty by half in 2015 (Amadi, 2012). The results remain abysmal in Africa as several scholars explicate (Clemens and Moss, 2004; Easterly, 2008; Amadi, 2012). One of the key problems with Western aid is its conditionality which furthers its anti-developmental stance and derails development of the poor societies (Easterly, 2008). Similar failures of aid is replicated in the failure of the G 8 countries to commit to their promises of offsetting aside certain percentage of their GDP as aid to the poor societies. Posner and Young (2007) have also demonstrated “donor pressures” which underscore how Western aid since the end of Cold War has largely been an instrument to pressure leaders not to extend their tenure of office.

2.4. Politicization of Human Rights

Whereas the State in Africa claims to be the guarantor of human rights and protector of live and property, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) repeatedly shows the persistent violation of human rights in Africa (HRW, 2010; 2011; 2014). Africa has one of the highest records of violation of human rights (HRW, 2015).

From recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa, extra judicial killings, War crimes, sexual violence as in Darfur Sudan, Mogadishu in Somalia, rape and abduction of Chibok school girls by the Boko Haram terrorist group in Northeast Nigeria, ethnic based crisis such as the genocide in Burundi in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994, ethnic crisis in Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya etc. HRW (2010) contends that in
Uganda, a 2007 law stipulates that NGOs should give seven days' notice to the government of any intention to make direct contact with the rural peoples.

Also in Egypt, the law concerning associations provides criminal penalties that suppress legitimate NGO activities such as engaging in political or union activities. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted in 1981, recognizes the right to development in its article 22: All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.

2.5. Politicization of Poverty

In popular media, global development discourse and scholarship, Africa is the poorest region of the world (Collier, 2007; World Bank, 2015). The World Bank (2005; 2015) posits that an average African subsists on less than $1 dollar per day. Chronic diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Ebola Virus (EBV), malaria, Zika Virus etc currently remains on the increase, poor health infrastructure, child killer diseases, poor schooling etc. Despite this common knowledge, Africa remains poorer. Jeffery Sachs (2005) captured the essence of politicization of poverty when he contends that:

> Every morning our newspapers could report, "More than 20,000 people perished yesterday of extreme poverty." The stories would put the stark numbers in context up to 8,000 children dead of malaria, 5,000 mothers and fathers dead of tuberculosis, 7,500 young adults dead of AIDS, and thousands more dead of diarrhea, respiratory infection, and other killer diseases that prey on bodies weakened by chronic hunger. The poor die in hospital wards that lack drugs, in villages that lack antimalarial bed nets, in houses that lack safe drinking water. They die namelessly, without public comment. Sadly, such stories rarely get written. Most people are unaware of the daily struggles for survival, and of the vast numbers of impoverished people around the world who lose that struggle (p.1).

The world’s GDP in 2008 was $60.6 trillion. Of that amount, Africa created a mere $987 billion. According to the World Bank, Africa accounts for 10 percent of the world’s population, but for 30 percent of the world’s poor.

The paradox of poverty is understood from the massive resources in Africa and unabated poverty. According to the 2006 United Nations Human Development Report, Africa’s grim statistics are unrelentingly negative. The poorest 23 countries in the world in terms of human development are all African. Primarily due to the spread of HIV/AIDS, life expectancy in Africa has dropped to just 46 years, while an estimated half of all Africans lack access to decent water and 30 percent are permanently undernourished.

2.6. Politicization of Corruption

Corruption is the diversion of public resource for private gain. A number of evidence suggests that governance in Africa has paid lip service to the fight against corruption. This suggests that the enormous challenges of corruption are given far narrower attention by African political elites than it deserves. Presently corruption has disrupted effective governance in South Africa, it has massively affected Nigeria culminating to the fall of Nigeria’s largest political party namely; the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP). Corruption dynamics are increasing fueling local conflicts across Africa including resurgence of terrorism and insurgents, militia groups, border disputes, smuggling, human trafficking, sex workers, electoral fraud, natural resource conflicts especially among the resource rich but poor countries such as Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Congo DR, South Sudan etc. Corruption remains a major development problem of Africa.

There has been alleged global fight against corruption, however effective transformation has been minimal. According to Transparency International (2013) Africa’s corruption perception index (CPI) ranks higher than other regions. Governance has been immersed into corruption. In a recent article Amadi and Ekekwe (2014) argue that public corruption in Africa has impeded Africa’s transition to developmental state. They argue that Majority of African Presidents have been accomplices in corruption such as South Africa under Jacob Zuma and Nigeria under Goodluck Jonathan. The State
in Africa becomes instrument of extortion and embezzlement. Bayart, et al; (1999) expand the study of corruption to include the most recent incidents of state-supported criminal activities in Africa such as money laundering and sashing of billions of national funds into private accounts abroad. Others include state terrorism, oppression and victimization. Such as the particular case of Boko Haram terrorism in Northeast Nigeria and the diversion of funds to procure arms by top government officials in Nigeria.

2.7. Politicization of Election and the Electoral Process

Nigerian Psephologist, Steve Wordu (2014) identified the increasing relevance of election as topical issues in seminars, workshops and conferences, however observed the inherent malfeasance in elections in most African societies such as Nigeria. In the context of politicization of election, the State is assumed to guarantee the conduct of free, fair and credible elections. Despite this assumption, Africa rarely has known records of free, fair and credible elections since the return to democratic rule in the 1990s. Most elections are crisis ridden and results are contested or settled in the law courts. According to the African Governance Report (2013) electoral integrity entails a set of norms and regulations to be established and enforced, in order to ensure professionalism, ethics, accountability and transparency. African elections are marred by violence, electoral fraud and irregularities. Posner and Young (2007) contend that despite competitive elections, African leaders who want to stay power do so as incumbent Presidents largely win elections in Africa.

The State propagates a set of strategy mediated by class interests and counter interests considered as mode of power acquisition. These are evident in electoral crisis, hooliganism, electoral fraud and irregularities. This results in a defected moral and ethical economy, promoting moral bankruptcy—based upon fractured understanding of the electoral system, social justice and equality. The State is built upon feigned structures for the elite by the elite. The implementation of counter developmental strategy relies upon the installation of a powerful structure as a moral framework and as a set of concrete prescriptions to control the activities of political elites which is falling because of weak civil society. For instance, in 2015 in Burundi, protestors took to the streets to oppose President Nkurunziza’s attempt to stand for a third term.

2.8. Politicization of Wars and Crisis in Africa

Africa has a long history of civil wars and similar internal crisis which have both political and economic undertone including Western perpetrators. There is hardly any crisis or war in Africa that does not have Western connection such as the Congo DR crisis and linkages with French multinational Elf (Collier, 2006). Since the 1990s, inter-state wars across boundaries are giving way for intra-state wars within boundaries such as the 1998 and 2015 xenophobic attacks in South Africa, the South Sudan internal crisis, Boko Haram terrorism in Northeast Nigeria, the Al-shabaab attacks in the Horn, the Algeria terrorist group known as al-Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Tuareg in Sudan, Mali etc, have all become central causes of political instability in Africa.

Since democracy resurgence, wars have reduced but not completely eradicated. From the 1988 to 1996 civil war in Somalia and the fall of Siad Barre (1991), the 1990 to 1996 civil war in Liberia and the fall of the Samuel Doe’s government in 1990 and emergence of Charles Taylor and his victory at the July 1997 presidential elections, the 1991 to 1998 outbreak of civil war in Algeria between government and Islamic extremists, the 1993 genocide in Burundi and 1994 genocidal massacres against Tutsi by Hutus in Rwanda, the 1996 to 1997 civil war in Zaire and overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997 and renaming of Zaire as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by Kabila, the 1998 civil war in Democratic Republic of the Congo as former allies fall out with Kabila, the 1999 massacre of civilians in Eastern Congo; the overthrow of President Henri Konan Bedie of Cote’d Ivoire in a military coup and prelude to civil war, the 2000 fight between Eritrea and Ethiopia; the assassination of Kabila in 2001 in DRC; his son Joseph becoming President; President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi and the signing of a power-sharing agreement to end eight years of civil war, the 2002 Death of Jonas Savimbi which ebbed the war in Angola; the 2003 resignation of Charles Taylor as president of Liberia, the 2004 Lord’s Resistance Army massacre of 200 in refugee camp in northern Uganda; the 2005 order of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda on new military offensive against Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

The emergence of First African woman President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, elected in Liberia in 2005 was however one of the key turning points in Liberia’s democracy especially in gender contexts.
Similarly, in 2005, President Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire and rebels agreed to end hostilities; the death in 2006 of John Garang in helicopter crash which disrupted peace in Sudan, in 2006, Uganda government and the LRA agreement to end war in Benin Republic, President Yayi won elections in 2006, against Mathieu Kerekou, who was in office for most of the time since he seized power in 1972, there were repeated crisis in the Horn and specifically the Somalia crisis, in north Africa was Algeria and bombings carried out by al-Qaeda.

In Burundi, there was a seeming stability after years of bloody conflict, but post-election tension in 2010 was intense. While the Arab spring which begun in Tunisia in 2010 demonstrates some level of civil emancipation in the entire North Africa. However, economic emancipation of the region remains minimal as conflict has renamed a substantial challenge including Muslim fundamentalists such as the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt. In particular, the failure of post Gadhafi Libya to demonstrate discernible level of economic transformation points to development challenge of Africa.

Beyond the end to the long civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone there are conflicts in other parts of Africa such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur region in Sudan, Tuareg nomads and their crisis in parts of Niger and Mali, in the southern Sahara region.

Exploring Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mills (2010) observes that; twelve years ago, one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II gripped this vast country, involving eight nations and affecting millions. Fighting persists in the east, home to the world’s worst sexual violence. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) does not have to be a splotch of darkness at Africa’s heart, routinely exporting instability across its borders and keeping its people down and insecure. Mills (2010) suggests that developmental change must come through home grown development strategies other than relying on aid.

The new Seleka rebel alliance in Central African Republic which ousted President Francois Bozize in March 2013 points to the indistinct results of Africa’s democracy.

2.9. The Politicization of Ethnic Identity

Ethnic identity politics is a key strand of African politics (Nnoi, 1978). Africa contains some 3,315 ethnic groups, and Nigeria has the most, with 455. Some African ethnic groups, spread over more than one country, are larger than some countries’ populations: about 40–50 million Oromo in Ethiopia and Kenya; 30 million Hausa in Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Chad, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan; 30 million Igbo in Cameroon and Nigeria; 20 million Akan in Ghana; 10 million Fulani (Pule or Fulbe) in Guinea, Nigeria, Niger and Senegal; and roughly similar numbers of Shona in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and of Zulu in South Africa (Lewis, 2009). As democracy is a game of numbers, the ethnic preponderant nationalities seem most favored as politicization of ethnicity with false ethnic consciousness becomes a predominant mode of politics in the multi ethnic African states. Mahmood Mamdani (1996) argues that colonialism created a form of decentralized despotism, in which people were contained in ethnic closets, and their power bases, political identity and allegiance, as well as their electoral horizon, were defined by those ethnic formations such as in Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan.

There are key political incidents in Uganda which had ethnic coloration such the 1964 to 1966 conflicts in which Prime Minister Milton Obote overthrew president Edward Mutesa, the 1971 coup by Idi Amin, the civil war of 1981 to 1986; and the insurgency in the north since 1987 have all had ethnicity as one of the driving factors (Anthony, 2002).

In Nigeria, the first military coup was erroneously termed Igbo coup which resulted an ethnic Pogrom against the Igbo living in northern Nigeria, this gave rise to a counter coup in 1966 and Subsequently a thirty month civil war 1967 to 1970. The eddies of ethnic politics remains high in a nascent democracy in Nigeria. In Burundi, since independence in 1962 there has been ethnic tension between the dominant Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority.

In the particular Kenyan experience, Aquiline Tarimo (2008) recounts: Kenya is a multi-ethnic society, and many communities have lived in harmony for many years. In recent years, however, the dominant ethnic groups have been on the forefront in fighting for political power. This situation has resulted into fighting to control the state. The relatively less dominant communities have been playing the card of opportunism. Many ethnic groups supported the armed struggle for independence in hope that they could regain their stolen lands. This expectation did not become reality. The situation has fomented
anger, resentment, lust for revenge, and aggressive competitiveness that has overlooked the common
good of the entire country.

Frustration among the poor, both in urban and rural areas, has created a growing tendency to use
violence as a viable means to correct the situation. When violent reactions emerge, under the
influence of ethno-political ideologies, tend to take the form of ethnocentrism, the ideology that
animates the competition between ethnic groups.

2.10. The Media and Politicization of Information

In the contemporary information age (Castells, 2000), official secrecy has remained a dominant mode
of governance in Africa. Although the State and the media have been instrumental in propagating a
laudatory relevance of democracy in Africa alleging its developmental relevance and to infuse a novel
notion of governance in Africa that appears pro poor and pro- development on face value. The
emergent political class and the political hegemony of the ruling party resort to this strategy to sing a
parody of novel development framings. While core governance activities are shrouded in top secrecy.

In Algeria there has been state monopoly of media. In September 2011 President Bouteflika ended
state monopoly over the media. Governance has also become a strong paraphernalia among political
office holders as they strive to build their personal legitimacy with propaganda and amedley of
promises for political relevance.

Conversely, policy discourse about existential realities such as present-day hardships, chronic
diseases, religious and ethnic, intolerance, insecurity and terrorism, absence of patriotism and new
nationalism remain minimal and point to negative image of governance as the critical mass are either
disillusioned, alienated, misinformed, uninformed or at the best shielded from access to information.

Freedom of Information (FOI) remains substantially maligned and contested. This results in
suppression of popular opinion and freedom of expression. Only censored and idealized images of the
state are propagated in the interest of the elite.

3. CONCLUSION

The questions that are at the heart of debates about the State and governance are not novel, they
assume new urgency in light of repeated state breaking and state failures in Africa (Ayoob, 1995;
Mazrui, 1995).

The interrogation of the capacity for governance and ability of the State to protect the lives of the
citizenry places much emphasis and critical attention on governance (Lodge, et al; 2015 ). This include
the ability to institutionalize equality, freedom and capacity to integrate people effectively as stake
holders on issues affecting them. These are key issues surrounding Sen’s conceptualization of
development as freedom. Thus, allowing people to participate on a wide range of issues that they
choose and have the capacity to do(Sen, 1999). Capacitation becomes central to governance
transformation.

This article has demonstrated that Africans and their patterns of governance have been active agents
of their poverty and underdevelopment as a result of compromise arising from corruption, vaulting
ambition, quest for political power, protracted civil wars, internal crisis, terrorism etc in such a way
that it becomes an anachronism to join the band wagon. Discipline becomes a misnomer and
corruption becomes a norm.

From this study it is deduced that Governance has paid lip service to development. The State, in
Africa has been predatory resulting in turn to a socio-political illusion and disconnect from the people
and government which defies definition by conventional theoretical means.

Thus, democracy recession remains strong and alive. Administrative capacity is central to governance
and effective service delivery. As Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich explain, administrative capacity is
the set of skills and competencies expected of public bureaucracies so that they can contribute to
problem-solving (Lodge, et al; 2015 ). Public administration should be framed within ethical
guidelines for effective service delivery in Africa.

From this study neither the State nor governance has attained adequately to development in Africa.
As in most developing democracies, keeping alive governance ideals by a saturation of the public
space with institutionalization of democracy culture will definitely serve state nationalism. It is not
enough to embrace Western models of development which may remain alien to development realities
of Africa.
Ake (1996) argues that Africa should evolve a democracy radically different from the Western model. The African state is yet to be a key player in the current democracy wave. What has distinctively differentiated it from most developing democracy is that Africa’s persistent internal crisis has largely made Africa a political refugee (Mazrui, 1995). Institutional overhaul of the public sector remains in doubt. Various government measures and strategies of the State continues to derail the transformation of the polity in the form of tangible sites, images, performances, and accomplishments.

Other than media hype and narratives, Africa is increasingly referred to as a “dark Continent”—an aphorism which was coined in the early colonial era or a “high risk”–area by so-called development partners, a term less commonly in use in most other developing regions. Elsewhere, are less, iconography of governance patterns in Africa, for example, from the adoption of the Bretton Woods Structural Adjustment programmes (SAP) of the 1980s till approximately the return to multi-party democracy in the 1990s, African countries could rarely evolve any self-reliant economic blueprint that could develop the polity other than the particular case of Ujamaa under Nyerere in Tanzania.

Africa needs alternative solutions. But what viable alternatives? African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)?, regional integration, or self-reliant development model? developmental state?, home grown democratization?, decolonization, recolonization or self-colonization? Pan Africanism, new nationalism, African pax-Africana? Some of these policy choices have been tried at different times some are still in practice either they failed or some have not been given adequate attention.

Beyond asserting that contemporary State in Africa should be an engine of radical overhaul of governance and public administration, the article demonstrates that the State is a colonial legacy and elitist, and suggests an “overhaul of the State apparatus in Africa” through proactive civil society orientation and collective ideology aimed at inclusive and participatory governance, where developmental administration and effective service delivery could be pursued to deconstruct State hegemony and legitimize popular governance for equitable and sustainable development.

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